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TAKING LEGAL ARGUMENT SERIOUSLY:
AN INTRODUCTION
© 1999 RICHARD S. MARKOVITS*
The phrase "taking legal argument seriously" can be used in a
number of different senses. The two that are most relevant for the
purposes of this Introduction might be called the "conviction" sense
and the "pragmatic-craftsmanship" sense. An individual takes a given
culture's legal argument seriously in the "conviction" sense if he
believes in the determinacy of both the moral legitimacy and validity
of each argument that might be employed to determine what the law
is in that culture' and in the internal correctness of all answers that
might be given to all legal-rights questions that may arise in that
culture (if he believes that objectively-determinable, valid legal
argument can generate internally-correct answers to all legal-rights
questions in the culture in question). By way of contrast, an individual
takes a given society's legal argument seriously in a "pragmatic-
craftsmanship" sense if he believes that the effectiveness of any
* Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School;
B.A., Cornell University (1963); Ph.D., London School of Economics (1966); L.L.B., Yale
University (1968); M.A., Oxford University (1981).
1. In my usage, the use of an argument to determine what the law is in a given culture is
"morally legitimate" if it is consistent with that society's moral commitments. By way of
contrast, the use of an argument to identify some extant legal right in a given culture is "valid" if
it is "legally correct." If the constitution of a given society imperfectly instantiates its moral
commitments, the use of a textual argument based on a clear, morally-illegitimate provision
whose concrete consequences were understood by its ratifiers at the time of ratification would
be legally valid even though morally illegitimate. In fact, I believe that in such a situation such a
textual argument would trump an argument of moral principle: in such a case, the internally-
correct answer to the relevant legal-rights question would be inconsistent with the society's
moral commitments. Although this type of outcome was not uncommon before the
Reconstruction Amendments prohibited slavery and imposed various negative and positive
obligations on the states, I do not think it is a significant possibility in the United States today.
In my book, RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL
ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1998) [hereinafter MATTERS OF
PRINCIPLE], I avoid using the terms "valid" or "validity" because they are associated with the
legal-positivist positions of such legal philosophers as J.L. Austin and H.L.A. Hart. However,
Arthur Applbaum's contribution to this symposium-see Arthur Isak Applbaum, Cultural
Convention and Legitimate Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 615, 619 (1999)-has convinced me that
using the terms "valid" and "validity" would generate more benefits than costs. I hasten to add
that Matters of Principle articulates and analyzes the distinction between "morally legitimate"
and "legally valid" legal argument: it just does not use the word "valid" or expression "legally
valid."
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argument that might be used to determine what the law is in that
culture will be increased if the argument is well crafted and perceived
to be a valid legal argument.2
In my admittedly armchair-empirical judgment, the percentage
of law professors who take the general category legal argument
substantially seriously in the conviction sense has declined
significantly over the past thirty years. Many contemporary law
professors seem to think that the concepts "morally-legitimate legal
argument" and "valid legal argument" are incoherent or that, in our
culture, the list of types of argument that can be legitimately or
validly used to determine extant legal rights is open-ended and
subject to contemporaneous social negotiation. Not surprisingly, most
of these same professors seem to have concluded that there is no
internally-right answer to any legal-rights question whose answer is
2. At least three other senses of "taking the general category 'legal argument' seriously"
are worth noting. First, an individual may appropriately be said to be taking legal argument
seriously as a general category in a "thoughtful consideration" or "consideration" sense if he
carefully considers the possibility that the legitimacy and validity of all arguments that might be
used to determine what the law is in a given culture may be determinate and that, in the culture
in question, there may be internally-correct answers to all legal-rights questions: individuals may
take legal argument seriously in this "consideration" sense even if, in the end, they conclude
that legal argument should not be taken seriously in the "conviction" sense. Second, and least
importantly, an individual may appropriately be said to be taking legal argument seriously in an
"aesthetic-craftsmanship" sense if he values well-crafted legal arguments for aesthetic reasons,
which he may do even if he does not think that well-crafted legal arguments are more effective
on that account. Third, an individual may take legal argument seriously in a "social importance"
sense if he believes that the concepts or phenomena "morally legitimate and valid legal
argument" are socially important-for example, because he believes that legal argument
influences the decisions of judges directly, because he thinks that belief in the coherence of the
concept legal argument or that belief in the moral legitimacy of the activity of engaging in legal
argument retards social reform by concealing what is really going on in the "law-discovering"
process, because he believes that a culture's legal argument affects its members' conception of
their culture or of themselves, because he believes that legal argument affects the culture's
judicial, legislative, and executive decisions and its members' conduct by influencing their
perceptions of their and their governments' obligations and the personal ultimate values to
which they subscribe, or because he believes that members of our culture pay a lot of attention
to legal argument (regardless of whether it affects legal decisions, social reform, or individual
conduct). As I indicated at the beginning of this footnote, in each of the five senses of "taking
legal argument seriously" just distinguished, what is being taken seriously is the general
category "legal argument," not specific legal arguments. Obviously, specific legal arguments can
also be taken seriously for a large number of reasons. Students may take a teacher's or court's
legal argument seriously to do well in a course, to learn something about morally-legitimate
legal argument or the internally-correct answer to some specific legal-rights question, to learn
something about the hypocritical ritual through which our society attempts to mask what is
really going on when "legal-rights decisions" are being made. Professors may take a student's
legal argument seriously to give him a grade or to help him learn something valuable. Anyone
may take a court's legal argument seriously to learn the legal truth, to consider whether there is
such a thing as "objective legal truth," to evaluate the performances of the relevant judges, etc.
However, it is essential to remember that the referent of all these last usages is a specific legal
argument or a class of specific legal arguments, not the general category legal argument on
which this symposium is focusing.
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contestable or perhaps just socially contested. Indeed, some
contemporary law professors even claim to believe that there are no
internally-right answers to any legal-rights questions.
Admittedly, some who would agree with my characterization of
the jurisprudential beliefs of many contemporary law professors
would deny that the distribution of jurisprudential positions has
changed much from the 1950s until now. They would argue that the
relevant sea-change took place much earlier, when Legal Realism
gained hold in the legal academy in the thirties, forties, and fifties. I
disagree. In my view, many if not most Legal Realists were
jurisprudential agnostics (or, perhaps more accurately, had no interest
in such jurisprudential issues as the coherence of the concepts
"morally-legitimate legal argument" and "valid legal argument" or
the existence of internally-right answers to contestable legal-rights
questions). Instead, they were interested in analyzing the
consequences of particular legal-rights decisions, the desirability of
various possible State responses to particular behaviors or problems,
and the causes of specific judicial decisions, particularly of judicial
decisions in cases that pose questions whose internally-right answers
are contestable (regardless of whether the internally-right answers to
these questions are "essentially contestable"). The Legal Realists'
lack of jurisprudential interest distinguishes them from many of their
progeny, whose jurisprudential positions underlie my claim about the
change that has taken place in the last thirty years. Many members of
the Critical Legal Studies movement, many Critical Race Theorists,
many Critical Gender Theorists, and many Feminist Legal Scholars
pay a lot of attention to the coherence of the concepts "morally
legitimate legal argument" and "valid legal argument" as well as to
the existence of internally-right answers to contestable or contested
legal-rights questions. Moreover, although the Legal Pragmatists tend
not to address such issues explicitly, their opposition to "Grand
Theory" and search for approaches that "work" betray their deep-
seated skepticism about the coherence of the notion of "justice" or
the possibility of operationalizing that concept in a useful way.
Why have most law professors who do not take legal argument
very seriously3 in the conviction sense decided not to do so? The best
account I can offer is that (1) they have not noticed that or they reject
the claim that members of our culture engage in two, essentially-
3. Obviously, one can take legal argument more or less seriously in each of the senses of
the expression.
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different types of prescriptive moral discourse- "moral-rights talk"
and "moral-ought talk," which are based on different moral norms
(which I respectively denominate "moral principles" and "personal
ultimate values"); (2) relatedly, they reject the claim that ours is a
rights-based culture-i.e., a culture in which moral-rights conclusions
trump moral-ought conclusions when the two conflict;4 (3) they
subscribe to the moral relativist or subjectivist position that there are
no objectively-right answers to ultimate-value questions; (4) they
recognize that in our culture there is no consensus on personal
ultimate values-i.e., that in our culture, there is no consensus on any
first-order conception of "the good"; and (5) because they have not
noticed or because they reject the claim that ours is a rights-based
culture, whose members engage in two types of prescriptive moral
discourse, they fail to recognize the possibility that or reject the claim
that, in our culture, internally-right answers to all moral-rights
questions and to many contested legal-rights questions may be
derived from the "moral principle" on which we are committed to
grounding our moral-rights discourse-may be derived from our
commitment to a second-order conception of "the good" that values,
inter alia, each individual's making up his own mind about the first-
order conception of the good that he wants his life to instantiate.
I should point out that the change that I have asserted has taken
place in the distribution of legal academics' jurisprudential views has
not, in my judgment, been restricted to members of the groups I
previously listed. Many legal academics who consider themselves to
be "main-stream" no longer take legal argument particularly seriously
in the conviction sense. Moreover, I believe there has been a parallel
rise in the past thirty years in the percentage of practicing lawyers,
judges, newspersons, and social critics who comment on the work of
the courts who assume that "legitimate legal argument" or "valid
legal argument" are determined by contemporaneous social
negotiation and that internally-right answers cannot be given to
contestable or contested legal-rights questions. I suspect that the
change in the jurisprudential convictions of these nonacademic law-
role players and law-observers partly reflects the change in the law
teaching they received as students, partly reflects the change in the
ideas they read in law professors' scholarship, op-ed pieces, letters to
4. For an elaboration of the difference between moral-rights talk and moral-ought talk,
see Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to Legal-
Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 415, 420-23 (1999) [hereinafter Legitimate Legal
Argument].
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the editor, and briefs, partly reflects the continuing tendency of all
types of lawyers to draw the wrong lesson from Lochner-to
conclude that Lochner teaches us to avoid using all normative
arguments to determine what the law is rather than to avoid using
inappropriate or incorrect normative arguments for this purpose-
and partly reflects the independent influence of the same ideas that,
to my mind, have misled many legal academics.
Before proceeding to describe the issues I hoped this symposium
would address and to summarize the papers it actually does contain, I
want to emphasize that this jurisprudential debate is not academic in
the pejorative sense of that word. To establish this point, I will
comment on (more accurately, "speculate about") the significant and
harmful effects that I fear the change in jurisprudential positions just
described has had on law school pedagogy, legal scholarship, lawyer
ethics, judicial decision-making, and judicial opinions.
I think that the reduction in the percentage of law professors
who take legal argument substantially seriously in the conviction
sense has had a significant effect on law school pedagogy. Admittedly,
the impact of this change on law teaching has been somewhat reduced
by the fact that many of the professors who equate morally-legitimate
or valid legal argument with socially-accepted legal argument and
believe that there are no internally-right answers to many legal-rights
questions do take legal argument seriously in the pragmatic-
craftsmanship sense. These professors' belief that the effectiveness of
a legal argument depends on its being well crafted and perceived to
be valid (as well as the fact that they enjoy and are good at legal
argument) leads them to teach their students how to make the various
types of arguments that seem to influence judges or show up in
judicial opinions. But this concession does not imply that these
professors' teaching is unaffected by their jurisprudential beliefs. At
least six such effects are notable. First, these professors' conclusion
that legal argument should not be taken seriously in the "conviction"
sense deters them from providing their students with a list of
legitimate or valid legal arguments or teaching their students the
structure of different types of morally-legitimate or valid legal
arguments. Second, these professors' jurisprudential conclusions lead
them to ignore the issue of whether the use of the various types of
argument they employ to determine what the law is is morally
legitimate or valid. For example, such professors sometimes use
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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various kinds of "prudential" arguments to determine what the law is
without questioning whether doing so is morally legitimate or legally
valid. Or, again, such professors also use historical arguments to
determine what the law is without asking how broad-gauged such
arguments must be for their use to be morally legitimate or legally
valid in our society. Third, most such law teachers react to their
conclusion that there are no internally-right answers to contestable
legal-rights questions by substituting analyses of what the law ought
to be from a personal-ultimate-value perspective that they endorse
for what the law is without indicating to students that that is what
they are doing: they smuggle various kinds of personal values
(utilitarian, nonliberal egalitarian, feminist, communitarian,
libertarian) and various non-values or proximate goals (allocative
efficiency) into their legal analyses without making any effort to
explain why these values or goals are inside the law, indeed, without
even raising this issue. Fourth, a smaller number of professors react to
their conclusion that no substantive norms are inside the law by
claiming that the "process" norm of democracy or popular
sovereignty, whose moral basis or force they do not bother to
examine, requires judges to adopt negative default-rules that imply
the constitutionality of any positive State choice that is under
consideration and the impropriety of a court's granting any
contestable claim that might be made by a plaintiff. Fifth, all such
professors' rejection of the claim that, to be morally legitimate, a
legal-rights argument must be consistent with our society's moral
commitments sends the message that "arguing like a lawyer" is really
nothing more than "manipulating like a lawyer." In one of my
student's words, we learn that "while there is no such thing as a
'winner' argument, there can always be a winner advocate." And
sixth, relatedly, and most insidiously, these teachers' pedagogy
implicitly denies that our society can be described as a rights-based
society in any meaningful sense.
In my judgment, these features of much contemporary law
teaching have had a number of undesirable effects. Before listing
them, I should admit both that I have no hard evidence to support my
speculations and that many of the consequences I attribute to law
school pedagogy have other, more general social causes (some of
which led law professors to adopt the positivist jurisprudential
positions with which I disagree).
Many law professors would not be much concerned with the first
effect I attribute to the increasing failure of law school pedagogy to
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take legal argument seriously in the conviction sense: the inability of
even the best of our law school graduates6 to give a presentable
abstract account of (1) the morally legitimate or legally valid way to
determine what the law is or (2) the relationship between morally-
legitimate or legally-valid legal argument and the appropriate way to
determine what the law ought to be.7
Second, and relatedly, I think that the actual ability of our
graduates to make sound legal arguments has been compromised
both by the failure of law school education to provide most law
students with explicit instruction in morally-legitimate or legally-valid
legal argument and by the reduction in the percentage of law school
class-time devoted to making and probing legal arguments (as
opposed to chatting about policy-I am afraid that the gerund in this
parenthetical reflects a considered choice). Although I admit that
many people can carry out nonintellectual or intellectual tasks well
without being able to explain what those tasks entail and that many
law professors and lawyers whose accounts of legitimate or valid legal
argument are simplistic actually make extremely sophisticated and
subtle legal arguments, I do think that our graduates' inability to give
a theoretical account of various types of legitimate or valid legal
argument harms their performance as lawyers: most people perform
intellectual tasks better if they have a sound abstract understanding of
how to execute those tasks. The associated decline in the quality of
legal argument is important not only in the short run (for the
percentage of cases that the internally-right party wins in the short
run) but also in the long run (for the correctness of the abstract law
interpretations judges give).
Third, I fear that the legal positivism that increasingly pervades
the law school classroom-the idea that legal education is learning
how to manipulate like a lawyer, the denial of the moral grounding of
law and what lawyers do-has reduced the ethical quality of our
graduates' professional performance not only by causing them to
spend less time on pro bono or public interest work but also by
leading them to misbehave when performing the law-tasks they do
undertake.
Fourth, and finally, I think that the change in legal pedagogy I
have asserted has reduced the extent to which our graduates take
6. I base this claim on my experiences interviewing candidates for entry-level faculty
positions at The University of Texas School of Law.
7. Admittedly, this second inability partly reflects the low quality of the policy analysis
that many law professors substitute for morally-legitimate argument about what the law is.
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rights seriously when serving as public officials, advisors to public
officials, or sources of information to the public at large. In so doing,
the change not only encourages specific moral-rights violations
directly but also endangers our society's commitment to rights in
general. I do not want to sound apocalyptic: I realize that legal
education and lawyer attitudes are not the primary cause of this type
of social outcome. But if you listen to many of the lawyers who
appear on TV to discuss constitutional cases or, more recently, the
impeachment proceedings against President Clinton, you will be
concerned by their failure to distinguish between legitimate or valid
legal argument and policy argument that ignores even the personal-
ultimate-value cost of the State's not fulfilling its obligations.
The increasing tendency of legal academics not to take legal
argument seriously in the conviction sense of that expression has also
affected their legal scholarship. Some of the relevant effects are
completely unobjectionable-in fact, are desirable. Some law
professors have been inspired by their legal positivism to develop real
interdisciplinary expertises and to use them to carry out historical
studies of what various law-role players did or to execute social
science analyses of the causes and consequences of various law-role
players' choices. Others have used such expertise to develop
illuminating, sound external-to-law policy analyses of particular
legislative or judicial decisions or options-policy analyses that they
indicate are not relevant to "internal" analyses of what the law is.
However, other law professors have responded to their conclusion
that there are no internally-right answers to contestable legal-rights
questions by writing articles that substitute external-to-law policy
argument 8 for what I would call morally-legitimate or legally-valid
legal argument without indicating the jurisprudential premises or
problematic character of what they have done. Thus, law-and-
economics scholars have written articles that purport to be about the
content of extant law that implicitly assume that the analysis of
allocative efficiency is an algorithm for the generation of internally-
correct answers to the common-law, constitutional-law, or statutory-
interpretation question they purport to be addressing. I recognize that
8. I recognize, of course, that policy arguments are sometimes internal to law. Thus,
arguments about whether a particular interpretation of an ambiguous or open-textured
statutory or constitutional provision will achieve the goals that the relevant document's overall
text, structure, and history imply it was designed to achieve are clearly inside the law. And
policy arguments that demonstrate that a State choice that imposes some losses on individuals
for whom the State is responsible while generating no benefits that the State is authorized to
secure is clearly relevant to that choice's constitutionality.
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such scholarship may provide useful information about what the law
ought to be and that some of these studies may even be relevant to
the determination of what the law is.9 My objection is that the authors
of these scholarly works do not attempt to establish the internal-to-
law relevance of their conclusions, indeed do not even acknowledge
the need to do so. Precisely the same objection can be raised to the
scholarship of those legal academics who read their neo-republican,
communitarian, libertarian, feminist, or nonliberal egalitarian value-
preferences into the law without mentioning their implicit assumption
that such values are relevant to determining what the law is, much
less analyzing the justifiability of that assumption. The scholarship of
law professors who try to justify their importation of their favorite
values into the law by writing law-office histories that purport to
validate the claim that their preferred values are the bedrock of
American constitutionalism is less objectionable but still not
satisfactory. Although many contemporary law professors would
agree with this criticism of the work of some libertarians, neo-
republicans, communitarians, Critical Legal Studies adherents,
feminists, Critical-Race Theorists, and law-and-economics scholars,
few have noticed that the same objections can be made to much of the
work of those "main-stream" law professors who are not so open
about the role that their personal value preferences are playing in
their purportedly morally-legitimate or legally-valid legal analyses.
I also fear that the view that no moral norm (other than the
unexamined process value of democracy or popular sovereignty) can
be objectively said to be inside the law has distorted judicial decision-
making and opinion-writing in the same ways (though in different
proportions) that it has distorted academic scholarship. Most of the
legal academics who reject the proposition that moral norms other
than democracy or popular sovereignty can be objectively said to be
inside the law in our culture have reacted to this conclusion by
importing their own preferred personal ultimate values into their
9. My objection is not that allocative-efficiency analysis is never relevant to the
determination of what the law is. Such analysis clearly is relevant to the interpretation of
statutory and constitutional provisions that were designed (perhaps inter alia) to increase
allocative efficiency, and (as I have argued elsewhere) I believe that in our liberal, rights-based
society a particular version of allocative-efficiency analysis is also relevant to the determination
of whether injurers have fulfilled their moral and legal duties in tort-related contexts. See
Richard S. Markovits, "You Cannot Be Serious!": A Reply to Professors Balkin and Levinson,
74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 602 n.80 (1999) [hereinafter "You Cannot Be Serious!"]; Richard S.
Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency and Distributional Desirability of Comparative
Negligence: Some Partial and Preliminary Third-Best Analyses (1998) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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purported analyses of what the law is and have concluded that those
values impose positive as well as negative obligations on the State and
support the appropriateness of recognizing a wide range of plaintiffs'
rights; a much smaller number of legal academics has concluded that
the appropriate response to their belief that no substantive moral
norms are inside the law is to conclude that members of our culture
have few rights against our governments and that plaintiffs have only
those rights that have clearly been recognized in positive law. A far
higher percentage of judges has adopted the latter position. Although
I suspect that many of these judges' decisions are actually influenced
by their external-to-law personal ultimate values, such judges claim
that their decisions are justified by legally-valid legal argument, which
in their hands is an arcane activity that is unrelated to any substantive
moral commitments and places great weight on the unexamined
process-value of democracy or popular sovereignty.
I do not want to leave the wrong impression. I think that, even
today, much judicial decision-making continues to be controlled by
the judges' sense of our society's moral commitments. Even when
Lochner and moral relativism deter judges from writing opinions that
reveal the extent to which their methodological and substantive
decisions were affected by their perceptions of our society's moral
commitments, arguments of moral principle substantially influence
their choices. Still, I fear that the trends I describe are significant and
regrettable.
This symposium was designed to stimulate discussion of (1) the
merits of "taking legal argument seriously" in the "conviction" sense
articulated above, (2) the history of the jurisprudential debate in
question, broadly understood, (3) the accuracy of my hypothesis that
over the past thirty years there has been a substantial change in the
distribution of the jurisprudential beliefs of American law professors,
practicing lawyers, judges, and legal commentators-inter alia, in the
extent to which such individuals take legal argument seriously in that
phrase's "conviction" sense, and (4) the consequences this
jurisprudential sea-change has had on legal pedagogy, legal
scholarship, lawyer ethics, and judicial decision-making and opinion-
writing (more particularly, both the existence and the desirability of
these consequences). Not surprisingly, given the difficulty of doing
rigorous research on any of the empirical issues my speculations raise,
the time-constraints under which all contributors to this symposium
were operating, and the proclivity of most of the actual participants to
do conceptual as opposed to empirical scholarship, no one has
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undertaken to test any of the admittedly not very well operationalized
hypotheses I offered about the changes in the jurisprudential views or
actual performance of various law-role players.
The articles the symposium contains can be placed into six
categories. The first category contains two articles that describe
debates in which the jurisprudential issues on which this symposium
focuses played a significant role. The second category contains two
articles that stress the importance of facts to legitimate legal
argument. One of these articles stresses the importance of instructing
law students on the critical role that facts often play in determining
what the law is. The other emphasizes the reality that formally-
correct, valid legal argument will not yield internally-correct answers
if it is combined with factual errors (or misperceptions of or disregard
for the values that underlie, say, a relevant statutory provision). The
three articles in the third category comment on various features of
morally-legitimate or valid legal argument in our culture or discuss
the existence of internally-right answers to legal-rights questions in
our culture. The fourth category contains four articles that explicitly
or implicitly critique the kind of nonpositivist position on valid legal
argument in our culture taken not only by me 10 but also by such
others as the Ronald Dworkin of Taking Rights Seriously1 and David
A.J. Richards as well as two articles that respond to critiques of this
position."2 The fifth category contains two articles that describe their
authors' pedagogic attempts to get their students to take both the
general category and specific examples of legal argument seriously.
One describes a textbook that is designed to teach students the
structure and content of the morally-legitimate and valid approach to
interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code. The other describes the
way in which its author has structured his lecture courses and seminar
to induce his students to engage in sustained, careful consideration of
a variety of specific legal and law-related arguments and to critique
and defend these arguments to the best of their abilities. The sixth
and final category of articles in the symposium contains two examples
of legal scholarship that analyze concrete legal issues (the actual and
morally-appropriate role of precedent in American law and free-
10. See MATrERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1; Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 4.
11. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)
12. In addition, one postscript to Legitimate Legal Argument offers my own critique of the
various objections that have led many members of the legal community to reject Dworkin's
antipositivism, see Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 4, at 475-83, and another analyzes
various arguments that purport to demonstrate the inability of legal theory to explain judges'
legal-rights conclusions, see id. at 485-88.
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speech rights) in a way that takes legal argument seriously in the
consideration sense while shedding light on how seriously it should be
taken in the conviction and pragmatic-craftsmanship senses. Both of
these articles also contain discussions of valid legal argument or the
existence of internally-right answers in our culture that this
Introduction will summarize under the third heading described above.
I should emphasize at the outset that the following accounts of
the articles in this symposium do not do justice to many of them.
Because my summaries focus on the relationship between these
articles and the central themes of the symposium, they ignore much of
the most interesting material in them.
Andy Morriss writes the first article describing a debate in which
the issues on which this symposium focuses played a major role. 3
More specifically, Morriss' article rehearses and comments on the
late-nineteenth-century debate provoked by David Dudley Field's
attempt to codify the common law. According to Morriss, code
proponents objected to the common law not only because its content
was uncertain and difficult to comprehend but also because "[t]he
common law inappropriately made judges into legislators.' 14 Code
opponents responded not only by questioning whether codification
could eliminate uncertainty without sacrificing justice but also by
insisting that "'law not known' was not the same as 'law not
existing""'5-that judges could discover "law not known" by making
reference to their society's "standard of justice." 6 As Morriss
recognizes, the proper resolution of this debate turns on whether the
relevant community's "standards of justice" can be objectively
determined and are part of the law. As Morriss also points out, the
nineteenth-century participants in the codification debate were much
more likely to answer these questions in the affirmative and to
appreciate the importance of doing so than are many of their
contemporary counterparts. 7
The second article that describes a debate in which the
jurisprudential issues with which this symposium is concerned plays a
central role analyzes an historical play rather than a piece of actual
history. Jeff Powell's analysis of Robert Bolt's famous play A Man for
13. See Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355
(1999).
14. Id. at 369.
15. Id. at 382.
16. Id. at 377.
17. See id. at 384-89.
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All Seasons"8 argues that the difference between the attitudes toward
law taken by the play's characters Thomas More and Thomas
Cromwell parallel the difference between those who take law
seriously in the conviction sense and those who take it seriously in
only the pragmatic-craftsmanship and "social importance" senses.
According to Powell, the Thomas More of A Man for All Seasons
"does take the law and legal argument seriously" 19 in my conviction
sense. Thus, More rejects Cromwell's view that "law is nothing but an
instrument or a weapon" 20 and that "legal argument... [is] hardly...
more than a grab-bag of conventional linguistic tricks."2' Powell
makes clear that he sides with More: "Law as doctrine and tradition
... makes political community possible among people with divergent
interests and perspectives who wish to be citizens-not subjects. 22
"[L]aw ... [is] a social bond that unites us even when we invoke it to
resolve our disputes. ' 23 "[S]ociety ... constitutes itself, in part, in and
through the law. '24
More dismisses Cromwell as a "pragmatist, the merest
plumber," 25 as a person who believes that legal argument is just an
administrative convenience. In Powell's words, for men like
Cromwell, "[t]aking legal argument seriously, other than for purely
instrumental purposes [(other than in the pragmatic-craftsmanship
sense)], is a superstition, a bizarre fetishism-an intellectual sin." 26 In
my judgment, Cromwell's jurisprudential position captures the beliefs
of most Crits, feminists, critical-race theorists, and Chicago-type law-
and-economics scholars as well of those neo-republicans,
communitarians, and libertarians who make arguments that assume
that the Constitution instantiates their value-preferences even though
they do not really think that the values they support are the values on
which American constitutionalism is based. I also think that those
who advocate courts' being guided by prudential argument whose use
I consider to be morally illegitimate 7 have bought into Cromwell's
18. See H. Jefferson Powell, Who's Afraid of Thomas Cromwell?, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
393 (1999).
19. Id. at 407.
20. Id. at 405.
21. Id. at 406.
22. Id. at 408.
23. Id. at 405.
24. Id. at 404.
25. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A PLAY IN Two AcTS 112-13 (Random
House 1960).
26. Powell, supra note 18, at 406.
27. See Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 4, at 432-33.
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position, at least to that extent. So too, have the modern Legal
Pragmatists, or at least those members of that group who believe that
justice is an undefinable and useless concept and that "what works"
should be defined in terms of the evaluator's personal ultimate
values.
In any event, although (by design) several of the other
contributors to this symposium would strongly disagree with Powell's
conclusion, I share his evaluation of the Cromwellian position:
"Lawyers cynical about their profession and judges willing to reach
the 'right' result at whatever cost to legal principle aren't clear-eyed
realists but short-sighted adversaries of the common good. 28
The second category of articles in this symposium contains
contributions that emphasize the important role that factual analysis
plays in morally-legitimate legal argument. Jack Getman's article
belongs in this category. Getman begins by making it clear that he
takes legal argument seriously in the "social importance" sense of
that phrase,29 though he takes no position on whether legal argument
should be taken seriously in my conviction sense. He then proceeds to
make three important points: (1) legal arguments that are "best" in
the sense of being formally perfect will not produce "just" results or
"sound" policy-decisions if they are combined with inaccurate factual
assumptions or if they are evaluated by judges who allow their own,
extra-legal values or evaluative assumptions (e.g., labor unions are
bad) to control their conclusions about what the law is; (2) in practice
in the United States, judicial decisions on extant legal rights have
been seriously distorted by such factual errors and extra-legal value-
views;30 (3) judicial, administrative, and academic factual ignorance
and judicial and administrative bias are not only pervasive but also, in
actual practice, irremediable. Getman concludes that the fact that
"our system works as well as it does" should be attributed to "the
remarkable diversity of the American political system" and that labor
(and presumably, more generally, the mistreated) can achieve justice
only by becoming "politically powerful."'"
28. Powell, supra note 18, at 408.
29. Getman begins by stating: "Legal argument is serious business. Important issues of
national policy are regularly determined and large sums of money are allocated by the
acceptance or rejection of legal argument." He then proceeds to point out that "[e]xplaining the
significance of legal argument to the public is a major industry." Julius Getman, A Labor
Lawyer's View of LegalArgument, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 409,409 (1999).
30. In labor law, Getman bases this conclusion on his own experience. See id. at 409-14. In
other fields, he bases it primarily on the reports of respected colleagues. See id. at 414.
31. Id. at 414 & n.20.
[Vol. 74:317
1999] TAKING LEGAL ARGUMENT SERIOUSLY: AN INTRODUCTION 331
I do not doubt that in many instances an accurate understanding
of "the facts" is critical to reaching internally-correct legal-rights
conclusions. In relation to the labor-law-rights questions Getman
specifically considers, the relevant facts include the options available
to the parties, the extent to which each option will enable its chooser
to secure the advantage he is entitled to achieve, the extent to which
each option will disserve the legitimate interests of its chooser's
opponents, the ability of the enforcement authorities to prevent the
relevant actors from choosing illegal options, and the consequences of
the various decisions the judge or NLRB official might make. I have
no doubt that wrong facts often lead to wrong legal-rights
conclusions. However, I suspect that a second-best analysis would
suggest not only that reducing the factual and value (e.g., antiunion
bias) imperfections in actual labor-law-rights analyses would make
the relevant legal-rights decisions more internally correct but that this
result could be secured as well by reducing imperfections in the
formal structure of the arguments that lawyers, judges, and NLRB
administrators use to argue about or decide the legal-rights questions
under consideration.
Dennis Patterson is the author of the second article that
emphasizes the importance of factual analysis for legitimate or valid
legal argument.32 More specifically, Patterson points out that one
often cannot decide how the Uniform Commercial Code applies to a
given case without accurately understanding all aspects of the
business transaction in question.33 Patterson also argues that the Code
reflects its creator's (Karl Llewellyn's) belief that "commercial
practices" rather than abstract (Langdellian) rules or principles "were
the best source for divining the law of a transaction": "When asking
whether the parties have an Agreement, and what the intent of that
Agreement might be, one looks not to legal norms but to what the
Code refers to (without definition) as 'the bargain of the parties in
fact.'34
Part or all of three articles belong in the third category I wish to
distinguish: articles that comment on various attributes of "morally-
32. See Dennis Patterson, Taking Commercial Law Seriously: From Jurisprudence to
Pedagogy, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625 (1999).
33. See id. at 630-31.
34. Id. at 626 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995)). Patterson also points out that one must
also understand the "relatively complicated relationships" between the parties to analyze
"whether either the parties or their lawyers might have done anything to avoid the problem that
produced the legal dispute." Id. at 630.
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legitimate" or valid legal argument taken as a category, set forth a
position on morally-legitimate or valid legal argument in our culture,
or analyze the extent to which there are internally-right answers to
legal-rights questions in our culture. Two articles partially fit into this
category and one (my own) belongs in it entirely.
Part of Michael Quinn's contribution to this symposium"5 deals
with the general issues just described. Quinn argues that, although
lawyers and judges are reluctant to make "explicit appeal[s]" to
principles of justice,3 6 moral principles are part of the law-in his
words "seep into" the law.37 Indeed, Quinn seems to believe that "the
Anglo-American legal system ... is shot through with moral
principles. ' 38 Quinn also recognizes the difference between what I call
"moral-rights" analysis and "moral-ought" analysis (in his terms, the
analysis of "moral rights"-which is "a matter of principle"-and
"policy analysis" 
-which is not a matter of principle).39 However, he
may well think that not only those moral norms I denominate "moral
principles" but also those moral norms I denominate "personal
ultimate values" are generically inside the law4° (though he recognizes
that the public at large would be unwilling to accept as legitimate
judges' using their own values to decide what the law is as opposed to
judges' discovering principles that were imbedded in the law but
never explicitly articulated4l). Finally, Quinn believes that although
there are internally wrong answers for every legal question and there
are internally right answers for a great many legal questions, there are
no unique internally-right answers for some legal-rights questions.4 2 I
would like to think that Quinn's conclusion on the internally-right-
answer issue is really that there is no unequivocally-internally-correct
answer to some legal-rights questions in our culture (a proposition
with which I agree) rather than that, in principle, there is no
internally-right answer to some legal-rights questions in our culture.
However, although there is some evidence to support this
35. See Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655 (1999).
36. See id. at 658.
37. See id. at 660.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 687-88.
40. At least, this may be the implication of Quinn's comment that some of the norms on
which "[c]ourts should rely ... are extra-legal" even though they "are somehow importantly
rooted in community practices" (though the reference to "community practices" leaves his
position somewhat in doubt). See id. at 673; see also id. at 667.
41. See id. at 704.
42. See id. at 666-71.
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interpretation, 43 the balance of the evidence points in the other
direction. Thus, Quinn suggests that it is inaccurate to say that courts
have done no more than discover preexisting law when they decide
cases on the basis of legal rules or principles that have not been
previously articulated" (though, even here, Quinn seems more
concerned with whether the public could anticipate these rulings-
whether there were sufficient "harbingers" to enable them to do so-
than with whether the newly-announced legal norm was implied by
previously-announced law4). And, most importantly, as his article's
title states and the bulk of his analysis purports to demonstrate, not
only is a wide variety of principles of stare decisis supported by
"sound and honorable legal practice" in individual jurisdictions, but
this "pluralism" of principles is "irreducible." 46 Thus, although Quinn
recognizes that our practice of precedent has a moral foundation, he
believes that "there is an irreducible pluralism of competing meta-
doctrines of stare decisis," that "there are no (meta)-meta-principles
for deciding when to use which rule of stare decisis," that the
"situation-sensibility" of "experienced lawyers" (whose importance
Karl Llewellyn stressed) can also not provide (much less supply an
articulate justification for) an internally-right answer to the question
which version of the doctrine of precedent is internally correct, and
that, consequently, "in the small set of cases" whose resolution turns
on the version of stare decisis that is employed, it will be impossible
to "find" an internally-right answer to the relevant legal-rights
question.47
The second article that should be discussed (in part) at this
juncture is David Richards' contribution to this symposium.48
Richards' analysis of the principle of free speech and the politics of
identity begins with some comments on morally-legitimate, valid legal
43. Thus, his discussion of "justice" deals both with the character of right answers to
questions of justice and the difficulties that the blurriness of the concept creates for achieving
consensus on those right answers. See id. at 678-80.
44. See id. at 694.
45. See id. at 690. If this is true, his position is the same as that of many Legal Realists, who
cared less about whether, in principle, internally-right answers existed to contestable legal-rights
questions than about how lawyers should advise clients who need to know what answer the
judge who would hear their case would give to the relevant legal-rights question. See MATTERS
OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 150.
46. See Quinn, supra note 35, at 692.
47. See id. at 693-94. Interestingly, Quinn's argument is a much more detailed (and
jurisprudentially self-conscious and sophisticated) version of an argument that Karl Llewellyn
made in KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 72-76 (1930).
48. See David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, the Principle of Free Speech, and
the Politics of Identity, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779 (1999).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
argument in our culture. Negatively, Richards argues that
constitutionalism (morally-legitimate legal argument) in our country
is not grounded on utilitarianism, perfectionist consequentialism, or a
commitment to process democracy. 49 Richards goes on to maintain
that those who try to argue from democracy do not seem to recognize
that it is "a contestable concept if there ever was one"50 and do not,
therefore, even attempt to give the kind of account of our
commitment to democracy from which conclusions about various free
speech and other issues could be derived.
In my judgment, our commitment to democracy is a corollary of
our more fundamental commitment to the moral norm that Richards
claims our Constitution instantiates: in his terms, the value of
individuals' making "conscientious" choices about how one should
lead one's life-the importance of the interest persons have in "the
free exercise of the moral powers of their reason through which
persons give enduring value to their lives and communities"51 - and
the correlative duty to show all creatures who can make such choices
"equal concern and respect."52 Richards bolsters this claim with
historical evidence of the importance of "the inalienable right to
conscience" to Jefferson and Madison, 3 the more contemporaneous
doctrinal conclusions of such legal academics as Harry Kalven, Jr.,
5 4
and the basic features of both our historic "free speech" doctrine and
recent developments in "free speech" law.55
The third article in this third category is my basic contribution to
this symposium. Legitimate Legal Argument begins by delineating my
conclusions about the moral character of our society-viz., that ours
is a liberal, rights-based society whose members and governments
have a basic duty to show appropriate, equal respect to all creatures
for whom they are responsible who have the potential to lead lives of
moral integrity as well as a derivative duty to show appropriate, equal
concern for such creatures, especially for their actualizing their
potential to lead such lives. I then claim that arguments derived from
49. See id. at 780, 789-90 (on utilitarianism), 804 (on perfectionist consequentialism), 791-
95 (on democracy).
50. Id. at 782; see id. at 791-95.
51. Id. at 796.
52. Id. at 790. The similarity between Richards' and my formulations of the (liberal) moral
principle on which (we both claim) our society is committed to grounding its moral-rights and
fundamental-fairness constitutional-rights discourse should be obvious.
53. See id. at 796.
54. See id. at 781.
55. See id. at 820-22.
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this duty (denominated "arguments of moral principle") are not only
inside the law but are the dominant mode of morally-legitimate legal
argument in our culture and that such arguments of moral principle
and the other modes of legal argument that can be legitimately used
to determine what the law is in our culture can yield internally-right
answers to all legal-rights questions in our society. The article also
analyzes from my perspective various alternative jurisprudential
positions, explores the problematic character of the negative default-
rule that many academic lawyers and judges support and invoke, and
analyzes the moral importance of there being internally-right answers
to all legal-rights questions in our society.
Five contributions to this symposium belong in the fourth
category I distinguish-articles that articulate or reply to criticisms of
the type of jurisprudential position my article propounds. Robin West
begins her article 6 by giving an account of Ronald Dworkin's
antipositivism and examining both its relation to his right-answer
thesis and its more general social significance. West then proceeds to
articulate and explore the errors in or limited force of five objections
that, in her judgment, have rendered Ronald Dworkin's antipositivist
position (which in its early formulation was similar to mine)
unpersuasive to most law professors, practicing lawyers, and judges:
the objections that (1) Dworkin's claims for the role that moral
principles play in legitimate and valid legal argument are inconsistent
with the way in which lawyers and judges talk and write;57 (2)
Dworkin's nonpositivism (and perhaps all liberal types of
nonpositivism) are associated with an "understanding of rights as
essentially negative claims against certain forms of state action," an
understanding that is unappealing to those who "view... the highest
function of law ... [to be] not the enforcement of negative rights
against the state, but the articulation of communitarian duties, or the
processual mediation of conflict, or the guarantee of safety or welfare,
or the enforcement of positive rights"58; (3) Dworkin's
nonpositivism-which, according to these objectors, implies that
lawyers should be agents of justice59-is inconsistent with the
obligations of zealous advocacy we actually impose on our lawyers; 6°
(4) Dworkin's nonpositivism is associated (on these objectors' view)
56. See Robin West, Taking MoralArgument Seriously, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 499 (1999).
57. See id. at 505-07.
58. Id. at 509.
59. See id. at 502.
60. See id. at 502-03.
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with the "overidentification of extant law with ideals of justice" 61; and
(5) Dworkin's antipositivism rejects the kind of moral relativism to
which most members of the legal community subscribe. 62 West
analyzes these objections and concludes that they do not "constitute
sound arguments against the prima facie case for taking Dworkin's
antipositivism seriously. '63
Tony D'Amato's article analyzes the point of legal theory (i.e.,
the point of accounts of legitimate legal argument). He begins by
discussing four arguments that he believes prove that legal theory
cannot improve judicial legal-rights decisions, generate internally-
right answers to legal-rights questions, or reveal the reasoning that
accounts for or rationalizes courts' decisions. The first such argument
he borrows from Stanley Fish: "We derive theory from practice;
therefore theory cannot constrain (or govern) the practice from which
it is derived."6 The second is that any legal theory that could be
imagined can explain all possible judicial resolutions of any case
equally satisfactorily-i.e., legal theories cannot be operationalized
sufficiently to enable them to generate unique right answers to any
legal-rights questions. 65 The third is that different judges support
different theories (which would admittedly preclude one from
explaining why a multimember court reached its decision in cases in
which no majority opinion could be written). 66 D'Amato attributes to
Einstein the fourth argument on which he relies (presumably to
demonstrate that legal theory cannot generate internally-right or
superior answers to legal-rights questions): "[O]ur theories of the
world determine the way we see the world. '67
Having dismissed the possibility of using legal theory to generate
superior or internally-right legal-rights answers or to reveal the
reasoning that led courts to make the decision they did, D'Amato
argues that the teaching of legal theory can still be justified for
pragmatic-craftsmanship reasons: since lawyers are supposed to
persuade judges and other official decision-makers and each such
61. Id. at 510.
62. See id. at 511-12.
63. Id. at 512. Although I agree with West's conclusion, I would sometimes respond to the
objections she lists in additional or somewhat different ways. See Legitimate Legal Argument,
supra note 4, at 475-83.
64. Anthony D'Amato, The Effect of Legal Theories on Judicial Decisions, 74 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 517-18 (1999).
65. See id. at 518-19.
66. See id. at 519-22.
67. Id. at 524.
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decision-maker does subscribe to a particular legal theory, the
professional training of lawyers should include legal theory to enable
them to recognize the legal theory to which the decision-makers they
will confront subscribe and to make the kinds of arguments those
officials will find persuasive. 68 In other words, after arguing that the
general category "legal argument" should not be taken seriously in
the conviction sense, D'Amato explains why particular judges'
specific legal arguments should be taken seriously in the pragmatic-
craftsmanship sense.69
Lawrence Friedman begins his essay by indicating that he is a
"skeptic" about whether internally-correct answers can be given to
"borderline and difficult [legal-rights] questions" 70 and proceeds to
make other statements that suggest that he also disagrees with the
other defining claims of my jurisprudential position. Thus, in addition
to stating that "in practice," "certainly ... today," the "clear line" that
I see between "a 'legal' argument and (say) a 'policy' argument"
"hardly exists," 71 he indicates that Max Weber's distinction between
"formal rationality" and "substantive rationality" -which is similar to
my distinction between morally-legitimate legal-rights analysis and
moral-ought ("policy") analysis-is "somewhat shaky. ' 72 In a similar
vein, he questions whether one should care about the internal
correctness of a court's legal-rights decision 73 and expresses doubts
about whether "social justice" is likely to be promoted by courts'
being helped by morally-legitimate legal argument to reach
internally-correct legal-rights conclusions. 74 Both these statements
suggest that Friedman rejects my two claims that moral-rights analysis
and moral-ought analysis are clearly distinguished in our culture and
that arguments of moral principle are the dominant form of morally-
68. See id. at 524-27.
69. For my critique of D'Amato's reasons for claiming that legal theory cannot explain the
arguments that led courts to make the decisions they rendered and analysis of the claim that
several of the same reasons demonstrate that legal theory cannot generate internally-right
answers to legal-rights questions, see Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 4, at 485-88.
70. Lawrence M. Friedman, Taking Law and Society Seriously, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 529,
529 (1999).
71. Id. at 533. I admit to believing that a clear line exists between morally-legitimate legal
argument and "policy" argument (although I agree that "policy arguments"-i.e., personal-
ultimate-value arguments-are sometimes inside the law). However, this belief is perfectly
consistent with my acknowledging that judges are not paying heed to this distinction in the way
they are obligated to do. Indeed, my perception that this is the case partially underlies my
proposing this symposium.
72. Id. at 533.
73. See id. at 529-30.
74. Admittedly, this is something of an interpolation of Friedman's remarks, see id. at 542.
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legitimate and valid legal argument in our culture. Of course, these
remarks might also reflect his doubts about the extent to which legal
argument influences judicial decisions 75 or the facts that he defines
"social justice" differently from the way in which I define this concept
(he uses this term to refer to what he believes we ought to do as
opposed to what we are obligated to do) and believes that "moral-
ought conclusions" ought to trump "moral-rights" conclusions.
In any event, Friedman's contribution to this symposium
demonstrates why law-and-society analyses should be taken seriously
by making a number of points that are valuable inter alia because
they shed light on intercultural differences in morally-legitimate legal
argument, on the extent to which morally-legitimate legal argument
should be taken seriously in the pragmatic-craftsmanship and "social
importance" senses of the expression, and (relatedly) on the extent to
which judges are fulfilling their professional obligations (as construed
by me and various others). Thus, Friedman's categorization of legal
systems in terms of the character of both the legal arguments made in
them and the legal conclusions they reach7 6 remind us that not all
societies are the kind of liberal, rights-based societies whose morally-
legitimate argument Dworkin, I, and most other nonpositivists
analyze. Some of the categories Friedman uses for this purpose are
ones that Dworkin and I also employ. For example, Friedman's
"instrumental" legal systems 77 are legal systems in cultures that we
would define to be goal-oriented. And his "closed" legal systems-
ones in which "only 'legal' premises can be used to construct an
argument"7 8- might correspond to systems that I would call morally
legitimate. At least, a rights-based culture would be true to its
commitments if it had a "closed" legal system in relation to debates
about extant legal rights (regardless of whether they have previously
been officially acknowledged or socially recognized) but not in
relation to debates about creating new legal rights. And, a goal-based
culture would be true to its commitments if it limited argument on all
sorts of issues to the following question: which of the various possible
decisions would maximize the achievement of the goal or goal-
combination to whose realization the culture was committed.
Friedman seems to be skeptical about whether "closed" legal systems
(in rights-based cultures?) that purport to rule out "the possibility of
75. See id. at 530-31.
76. See id. at 534-39.
77. See id. at 537.
78. Id. at 536.
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innovation"-of discovering rights that have not previously been
officially recognized or perhaps even socially articulated-can
succeed in stifling such innovation."9 I would question the moral
legitimacy of any attempts such cultures make to deter innovation of
this kind (though not of their attempts to prevent judges from
legislating).
Friedman also challenges us to reconsider whether legal
argument should be taken seriously in the pragmatic-craftsmanship
and "social importance" senses by pointing out the distinction
between affecting "the result of a case" and affecting the reasons the
court gives for its conclusion,80 by stressing the difficulty of
determining the actual impact of legal (and other types of arguments)
on judicial decision-making-given the possibility that judicial
opinions may not actually indicate what led the judges to their
conclusions, 81 and by indicating the paucity of empirical evidence on
both this issue and the different issue of "[w]hat kinds of arguments
get treated with respect" in the sense of having to be treated "with
care" even if they do "not actually change the minds of judges. 82
Friedman also challenges the assumption that legal argument is
"socially important" in the sense of influencing public opinion by
reporting anecdotally that he "saw no evidence that any legal
argument-no matter how clever-changed anybody's mind" in the
controversy over Clinton's impeachment 83 and by claiming that,
although the public knows "the results of a handful of important
cases," it knows nothing about the arguments that supposedly led the
courts to the decisions in these cases:84 Friedman's "hunch is that
there is nothing to" the contention that legal argument trickles down
to the public.85
Friedman also makes the historical point that the types of
argument that are taken seriously in adjudicative contexts vary not
79. See id. at 536-37.
80. See id. at 532. I should add that even if the arguments that a court's opinion used to
justify its conclusion really were the arguments that led it to reach its conclusion, these
arguments may not have affected the identity of the winning party or the remedy he obtained
since the court might have reached the same conclusion for different reasons if the arguments
that led it to reach its conclusion had never been made. Of course, any related difference in the
court's ratio decidendi might have a significant impact on that part of "the result of a case" that
reflects its precedential impact.
81. See id. at 530.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 531.
85. See id.
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only from society to society but also in the same society from time to
time.86 The latter fact obviously disfavors the account that I have
given of our society's constant moral commitments and their
implications for the structure of morally-legitimate legal argument
within it, though I do not think that the related non-fits refute my
position on these matters.
On the other hand, Friedman's claim that "styles of reasoning
and argument ... are closely tied to ruling constructs in a society or
within a legal culture -particularly concepts of legitimacy"8 and his
assertion that "forms of legitimacy and types of argument are
different in legislatures compared to courts" 88 are both consistent with
the nonpositivist position that Dworkin, I, and others have taken.
Friedman concludes with some remarks about legal education.
He advocates revising the law school curriculum to place more
emphasis on interdisciplinary courses that give students a better
understanding "of the context in which legal systems operate" and to
include more "real skills training ... in what lawyers actually do"89
and disagrees with my proposal that more attention be given to
teaching students legitimate legal argument ° Given Lawrence's
skepticism about how seriously morally-legitimate legal argument
should be taken not only in the conviction sense but also in the
pragmatic-consideration and "social importance" senses, his
pedagogic conclusions are hardly surprising.
Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson's article criticizes my usage of
"taking legal argument seriously" and offers an armchair-empirical
refutation of my conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument
in our culture. 91 They have two objections to my usage of what they
refer to as "taking legal reasoning seriously." Both assume that I
equate "taking legal reasoning seriously" with agreeing with my
conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture. 92
The first is that I fail to appreciate the fact that what constitutes
86. See id.
87. Id. at 537.
88. Id. at 537-38.
89. Id. at 541.
90. Although I agree that more interdisciplinary training should be given to law students in
part because I think that such materials can play a role in legitimate legal argument, I am less
persuaded of the desirability of giving additional skills training to those students who will
practice in high-quality firms that provide their associates with such training on the job.
91. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Getting Serious About "Taking Legal Reasoning
Seriously", 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543 (1999).
92. See id. at 543-44.
[Vol. 74:317
1999] TAKING LEGAL ARGUMENT SERIOUSLY: AN INTRODUCTION 341
morally-legitimate legal argument differs for different law-role
players. The second is that in denying that people who disagree with
my conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument may be
taking legal reasoning seriously in a significant sense, I am not only
making a linguistic mistake but making a "disciplining move"
designed to exclude from the debate those who disagree with me.93
Balkin and Levinson's empirical critique of my positions on morally-
legitimate legal argument and internally-right answers to legal-rights
questions in our culture asserts that my conclusions are refuted by
their inconsistency with both the informed beliefs of members of our
society about the obligations of various law-role players and the way
in which such law-role players actually carry out their duties.94
My Reply to Balkin and Levinson 95 contests both the criticism
they make of my usage of "taking legal argument seriously ' 96 and
their empirical critique of my conclusions about "morally-legitimate
legal argument" and "internally-right answers to all legal-rights
questions" in our cultureY My Reply makes two arguments against
their linguistic criticism of my usage of "taking legal argument
seriously." First, I show that the draft-Introduction to this symposium
to which they were responding as well as this published Introduction
make it abundantly clear that I do not equate "taking legal argument
seriously" in any sense with agreeing with all my basic jurisprudential
conclusions.98 Second, I argue that, although I understand why Balkin
and Levinson do not like to be told that those who subscribe to their
jurisprudential position are not taking legal argument seriously in at
least one important sense of that expression, they will just have to live
with that reality. Balkin and Levinson believe that what counts as
morally-legitimate legal argument is a matter of contemporaneous
social negotiation and that there are no internally-right answers to
many important legal-rights questions. My Reply argues that,
although people who hold this view may take legal argument
seriously in both craftsmanship senses, in the "social importance"
sense, and in the consideration sense, it is accurate to say that they do
not take legal argument seriously in the conviction sense of that
93. See id. at 544.
94. See id. at 544-48.
95. See "You Cannot Be Serious!", supra note 9.
96. See id. at 564-78.
97. See id. at 578-613.
98. See id. at 564-69.
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expression.99 The truth of that claim' °° does not depend on my
motivation for making it (which, I am confident, was just to state the
truth).
The second part of my Reply to Balkin and Levinson focuses on
their alleged empirical refutation of my basic jurisprudential
conclusions. It argues that this part of Balkin and Levinson's critique
fails for four reasons:
(1) their argument is partially based on false conclusions they reach
about the implications of my jurisprudential position for the
obligations of various law-role players;101
(2) their argument partially relies on inaccurate or contestable
empirical assumptions about people's beliefs about the
obligations of these law-role players and the positive law that
relates to these law-role players' legal obligations;10 2
(3) their argument partially relies on inaccurate or contestable
empirical assumptions about the actual behavior of the relevant
law-role players;103 and
(4) their argument ignores the fact that the damage that non-fits do
to my position will be reduced if they can be explained in some
relevant way' 4  and ignores as well the fact that the
persuasiveness of my jurisprudential conclusions depends on
their discounted-fitting all of our society's moral-rights practices
rather than its legal-rights practices, which are a subset of its
moral-rights practices (an error that is a corollary of their
mistaken belief that our society's legal practice is morally self-
legitimating) .105
The last paper that belongs to this category is Arthur
Applbaum's. 1°6 Applbaum focuses on the jurisprudential argument I
made both in Legitimate Legal Argument and in Matters of
Principle.'O" Although Applbaum indicates that he generally agrees
99. See id. at 569-72.
100. Somewhat more contentiously, I assert in this Introduction that, empirically, some of
those who agree with Balkin and Levinson's conclusions (though certainly not Balkin and
Levinson themselves) have not taken legal argument seriously in the consideration sense. See
supra text accompanying note 32. I should add that I also admit that the same may be said for
some observers who do take legal argument seriously in the conviction sense.
101. See "You Cannot Be Serious!", supra note 9, at 580-98.
102. See id. at 598-609.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 609-11.
105. See id. at 611-13.
106. See Applbaum, supra note 1.
107. See supra notes 1, 4.
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with my basic moral and jurisprudential conclusions,108 he makes four
different but related objections to either the general type of
"conventionalist" argument I made for them 09 or specific features of
the actual argument I made.
Applbaum's first objection might be called a "truth" objection to
conventionalist moral arguments in general. This "truth" objection is
that conventionalist argument cannot justify the universal premise
(which I assert) that the use of a legal argument is morally legitimate
in a given culture if and only if that use is consistent with that
culture's moral commitments.110 Applbaum thinks that this objection
is justified not only because one can imagine cultures (such as his
Republic of Razland) whose members are committed to evaluating
each other's conduct from a liberal, rights-based perspective but are
positivists in law' but also because one cannot justify a conclusion
that this combination of liberal, rights-based morality and legal
positivism is "inconsistent, n12 not "coherent," 13 "absurd," '114 or not
"moral."'15 In his view, "A culture, whether or not it is a moral rights
culture, can be morally committed to a number of coherent views that
take a number of different stands on the connection between its
morality and its law."11 6 Moreover, in Applbaum's opinion, "on the
conventionalist view, there is no place to stand and say that it is a
mistake" from their own perspective for the members of a culture to
reject the claim that it is morally illegitimate for their law to fail to
instantiate the moral norms on which they are committed to
evaluating their own and each other's behaviors."7
Applbaum's second objection to what he takes to be my position
is a "consequences" objection. This objection is a corollary of his
"truth" objection. Because, in his judgment, "conventionalists"
cannot dismiss as inconsistent, incoherent, or nonmoral the
Razlanders' disconnect between their nonlegal moral norm and their
legal positivism, one cannot justify the conclusion that it is "morally
illegitimate" for a society whose members are committed to
108. See Applbaum, supra note 1, at 615.
109. See id. at 615-16, 624.
110. See id. at 620.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 621.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 620.
117. See id.
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evaluating each other's conduct and beliefs from a liberal, rights-
based perspective to use arguments to determine the relevant parties'
legal rights that they were committed to rejecting when determining
the relevant parties' moral rights or to reach legal-rights conclusions
that do not protect on balance the moral-rights-related interests the
society recognizes (or, in a goal-based society, do not promote the
ultimate values on which the society is committed to grounding its
individual decision-making).
According to Applbaum, both these problems are avoidable.
Proper attention to "the foundational questions in moral theory that
both [I and Applbaum] have left for another day"1 18 would yield the
conclusion that there are universally-correct moral principles whose
establishment would imply the moral incorrectness of anything but a
liberal, rights-based morality and hence the moral illegitimacy of legal
positivism 119 (regardless of the moral and legal beliefs of the members
of the culture on which one is focusing).
Before proceeding to the final two objections Applbaum makes
to my analysis, I should like to point out some of the implications of
Applbaum's own foundationalist views. At an abstract level,
Applbaum's belief that one can demonstrate the objective moral
correctness of rights-oriented liberalism implies that all goal-based
societies and all nonliberal, rights-based societies have made an
objective moral error. At a more applied level, it should be noted that
Applbaum's critique of my position would apply equally forcefully to
Dworkin's position to the extent that Dworkin relies on the same
criteria of "fit" and "explicability of non-fits" as I do. Admittedly, to
the extent that Dworkin's third, "best light" criterion (which I reject)
implies that judges are authorized to engage in the kind of
foundationalist analysis that Applbaum thinks one must execute,
Applbaum's criticism of my approach will not apply to Dworkin's.
However, the fact that such a foundationalist analysis would render
Dworkin's (and my) "fit" and "explicability-of-non-fits" criteria
otiose suggests that Dworkin's "best-light" analysis is not
foundationalist in Applbaum's sense but involves (as I have suggested
both in this symposium' 20 and in Matters of Principlel2l) the use of
personal ultimate values. If that is the case, Applbaum will find
Dworkin's approach at least as objectionable as mine.
118. Id. at 624.
119. See id.
120. See Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 4, at 452.
121. See MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 94-95.
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Applbaum's third objection to my analysis is also a
"consequences" objection. He seems to object to my claim that a
legal-rights conclusion that is inconsistent with the moral
commitments of the society in which it is reached will be internally
correct if it follows from a clear constitutional text or a statute that a
clear constitutional text implies is constitutional even if that clear
constitutional text is itself inconsistent with the moral commitments
of the relevant society so long as the concrete import of the morally-
illegitimate22 constitutional provision in question (though perhaps not
its moral illegitimacy) was understood by its ratifiers at the time they
ratified it. I hasten to add that this statement of Applbaum's third
objection may be incorrect: he may be objecting to any claim that
such a legal ruling would be "legitimate" as opposed to internally
correct. If that is his objection, I agree with it and regret that my
misuse of the word "legitimate" in one footnote of Matters of
Principle that he cites 123 may have led him to misapprehend my
position (though I do think that the rest of the book and the draft of
Legitimate Legal Argument that he saw did accurately articulate my
actual views on this issue124).
Applbaum's fourth objection to my analysis is that I have not
sufficiently clarified how I propose to determine "a culture's moral
commitments" - in particular, how I identify the beliefs from which
such commitments must be (partially) inferred,12' that I have not
stated "which attributes are necessary for a purported moral value to
be a moral value,"' 26 and that I have not adequately defined "moral
legitimacy," "moral rightness or justice," and "validity" or
appropriately examined the relationship among them. 127
Applbaum's objections to my position are obviously important,
but this Introduction is not the place for me to address them.
Postscript C to Legitimate Legal Argument explains why it may be
misleading to describe my position as "conventionalist" and, partly
relatedly, why I do not find Applbaum's specific objections to my
argument accurate or convincing.
122. See Applbaum, supra note 1, at 618.
123. See MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 389 n.31, as cited by Applbaum, supra
note 1, at 620 n.10.
124. The current version of Legitimate Legal Argument, which was expanded in response to
Applbaum's critique, makes my position absolutely clear. See Legitimate Legal Argument, supra
note 4, at 415 n.1.
125. See Applbaum, supra note 1, at 616-17.
126. Id. at 617.
127. See id. at 623.
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The articles in this symposium that belong in my fifth category
describe pedagogic attempts to get law students to take the general
category legal argument seriously, to dissect and criticize particular
legal arguments that others have made, or to create sound legal
arguments of their own. I have already reported on one aspect of the
first of these articles-Dennis Patterson's. 12 8 Patterson comments on
the jurisprudential background of the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 9
describes the various ways in which commercial law is taught in
American law schools,130 explains the pedagogic goals he and his co-
author Richard Hyland have tried to achieve in writing their new
commercial-law textbook, "1 ' and provides a sample of the textbook
that gives a good sense of their pedagogic aspirations and the
technique they use to achieve their goals.132 In addition to stressing
the importance of facts in legal argument, the Hyland-Patterson
textbook emphasizes that the proper interpretation of one provision
in a complex set of statutes will often be influenced by other
provisions of the statutes in question that relate to the relevant
transactions.13  Although the book does cover a substantial range of
doctrine, it does not emphasize teaching the formulaic standards of
commercial law. Students are taught to master "the facts of the case"
before doing anything else. These facts include the relationship
between the parties and the point of the transaction to its respective
participants. After the students have mastered the relevant facts, they
are asked to devise an approach to or solution of the problems
posed-i.e., to "construct a legal solution.""134 Only at that point do
they look at the opinion of the court in the case in question."5 Rather
than printing an edited version of the opinion and then appending a
series of questions about it, the Hyland-Patterson book places its
authors' observations and questions-set off in different typeface-in
the midst of the opinion.
Patterson's article and the Hyland-Patterson textbook it
describes take legal reasoning seriously in a variety of ways. First, the
article explains that a certain conception of legitimate legal argument
128. See Patterson, supra note 32.
129. See id. at 625-27.
130. See id. at 627-29.
131. See id. at 629-33. The textbook is RICHARD HYLAND & DENNIS PATTERSON,
INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL LAW (1999).
132. See Patterson, supra note 32, at 635-45.
133. See id. at 630-31.
134. Id. at 630.
135. See id.
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underlies the Uniform Commercial Code-"[T]he Code ... is the
earliest, if not the purest, expression of a [Realist] jurisprudence."'' 6
Second, the textbook manifests its authors' belief that it is more
important for law students to learn about morally-legitimate and valid
legal argument than to learn the rules and principles of law: in
Patterson's words, "methodology is central." 137 Third, both the article
and the casebook manifest Patterson's belief that the best way for
students to learn legal methodology is to devise careful legal
arguments themselves and to rely on that experience to detect
"errors, gaps, or inconsistencies" in judicial opinions on the same
issue. 138
Although Patterson's article does not directly address why legal
argument should be taken seriously (aside from saying that a certain
view of valid legal argument has had a substantial influence on the
substance of the Uniform Commercial Code), it implicitly suggests
that legal argument should be taken seriously not only in the "social
importance" sense of the expression but also in its pragmatic-
craftsmanship, consideration, and conviction senses.
Vince Blasi is the author of the second article on legal pedagogy
in this symposium. 139 Blasi does not indicate whether he agrees with
my three basic pedagogic claims-that law students are currently
given insufficient instruction in morally-legitimate legal argument,
that over the past thirty years there has been a substantial decrease in
the percentage of law school class-time devoted to such instruction,
and that over the past thirty years there has been a substantial
increase in the extent to which external-to-law policy analysis has
been conflated with morally-legitimate and valid legal argument.
Instead, Blasi addresses a different issue. In his judgment (which I
share):
Reasoning skills of a certain sort are taught well in the
traditional law school curriculum.... Many students learn a lot
about linguistic indeterminacy, unintended consequences, the
allocation of decision-making responsibility, and how much turns
on which questions are asked and how they are framed....
136. Id. at 627.
137. Id. at 629.
138. See id. at 630.
139. See Vincent Blasi, Teaching Reasoning, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 647 (1999).
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Where legal education falls short ... is [teaching students]
reasoning skills that require patience, attention to detail, selectivity,
and a sense of argumentative architecture[,] ... [teaching them how
to] construct[] [and] criticiz[e] complex arguments[,] ... [how to
engage in] sustained analysis and argumentation.n°
Blasi argues that this deficiency of legal education has several
causes: large class sizes, coverage pressure (which causes even many
seminars to focus on providing students with enough information to
be able to do something worthwhile in a specialized area), and an
examination system that puts students under pressure that precludes
them from "unpack[ing] or evaluat[ing] ... [the] arguments [they are
required to spot] to any great degree" 41 -a practice that (in my
opinion) also reflects the abysmal student/faculty ratios in law schools
as well as the fact that law school professors do not have teaching
assistants to help them with their grading (a consequence of law
schools' not being academic training grounds).
Having described and explained the world, Blasi proceeds to give
an account of his attempt to change it. Blasi has arranged all three of
his offerings142-a course on First Amendment doctrine, a course on
"the history of ideas relating to religious and political liberty," '143 and a
seminar on First Amendment Theory-to force the students to
engage in a "systematic assessment" of an argument, to read and re-
read a substantial argument from a short list he provides of relevant
judicial opinions, philosophic essays, and law review articles, and-
after much "focused critical reflection" 144-to produce a ten-page
(3500-word) critique of the argument in question.
In his seminars, Blasi also tries to encourage the students to take
reasoning seriously. With this goal in mind, he has made two crucial
pedagogic choices. First, he limits the amount of reading students
must do each week (usually to under fifty pages) to enable them to
become sufficiently conversant with the author's argument to feel
comfortable participating in the discussion. Second, he requires the
student who is providing the ten-page critique of the article to be
discussed that day to submit it ten days before the seminar meeting,
requires all other students in the seminar to read their colleague's
critique, and assigns one of the other students the duty of defending
140. Id. at 647.
141. Id. at 648.
142. See id. at 649-53.
143. Id. at 649.
144. Id.
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the article being criticized (after discussing it with its student-critic).45
In his courses, Blasi also tries to get students to take reasoning
seriously both by assigning students unedited opinions or scholarly
essays and by requiring each student to write four two-to-three-page
papers during the semester that devise and examine the significance
of hypotheticals that test the validity or illuminate the implications of
a judicial opinion or that respond to a narrowly-defined question
Blasi has posed about the article or opinion assigned for that week.' 46
Blasi uses a variety of other techniques to encourage his students
to perform up to their capabilities: he "include[s] in the class
materials after each principal essay or opinion one of the best
critiques of that work [he has] received in the past";147 he "stress[es] to
students the importance of fine tuning their arguments and not
overreaching";148 and he tells his students repeatedly "that they will
have to push themselves to do their absolute best in terms of both
rigor and creativity.' '149
I have already summarized the more abstract, jurisprudential
portions of the two articles (by Michael Quinn and David Richards)
that belong in the sixth category previously distinguished- articles
that analyze concrete legal issues in ways that are jurisprudentially
illuminating. Quinn's article analyzes the doctrine of precedent or
stare decisis in Texas while advancing ideas on a wide variety of issues
that have important jurisprudential and law-and-society implications.
Thus, among other subjects, Quinn discusses:
(1) the conceptual ambiguity of the concept of "the holding of a
case" and the difficulty of identifying "the holding of a particular
case" on several of that concept's defensible definitions; 150
(2) the related difficulty of defining the concept of judicial "dicta,"
the variety of types of dicta that members of the legal community
distinguish, and the difficulty of operationalizing the definition of
several of those types of dicta;"1
(3) the six families of "distinct versions (or theories) of stare
145. See id. at 652.
146. See id. at 651.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 650.
149. Id. In Blasi's words: "Shameless nagging is underrated as a teaching technique, I have
come to believe." Id.
150. See Quinn, supra note 35, 711-12.
151. See id. at 712-30.
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decisis '' 15 2 that Texas courts or lawyers have said were the law of
Texas or have applied in actual cases; 53
(4) the jurisprudential assumptions of various particular theories of
stare decisis;
(5) the reasons why people in general find particular theories of
stare decisis personally attractive 154 and the law-role-related
reasons why lawyers,155 judges,1 6 and law professors5 7 favor
particular theories of stare decisis;
(6) the advantages and disadvantages of the various theories of stare
decisis both from a rights or Rule of Law perspective 58 and from
a policy or personal-ultimate-value perspective; 15 9
(7) the "irreducible pluralism" of even a single jurisdiction's stare
decisis beliefs and practices-irreducible because, even though
one can give a moral account of our general practice of
precedent, there is no objectively-correct way to choose among
various meta-meta-theories of the practice; 160
(8) the implications of this irreducible pluralism for legal advocacy;161
and
(9) the jurisprudential implications of the irreducible pluralism of
our stare decisis theories and practice.162
The second article in this last category and the final article in the
symposium is David Richards' analysis of the internally-correct
answer to various free-speech constitutional-rights issues in the
United States. As I have already indicated, Richards approaches
these issues on the assumption that our society is a liberal, rights-
based society and that the moral norms to which we are committed
(and their various "political" corollaries) control the internally-
correct resolution of constitutional-law free-speech issues in the
United States.
Richards argues that our commitment to respecting the right of
individuals to make decisions of conscience for themselves accounts
152. Id. at 694.
153. See id. at 694-98.
154. See id. at 766.
155. See id. at 698-709.
156. See id. at 767-68.
157. See id. at 762-63.
158. See id. at 688-91.
159. See id. at 687-88.
160. See id. at 692-93.
161. See id. at 771-74.
162. See id. at 766-71.
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for or justicizes (my word) many features of our positive free-speech
law. Thus, the value we are committed to placing on "moral
independence," "liberty of conscience," and "the inalienable human
right[] [of persons] reasonably to exercise their own moral powers"
on religious and moral issues163 implies that speech that relates to such
issues may be abridged only to prevent an "imminent, nonrebuttable,
and very grave secular harm"'164 and that subversive advocacy and
group libel are protected in this way. 16 According to Richards, our
commitment to valuing "the critical discussion and rebuttal central to
the conscientious formation, revision, and evaluation of values' 1 66 also
implies that defamation of individuals, obscene materials, and some
types of advertising 67 are entitled to more protection than could be
provided by utilitarian, perfectionist consequentialist, or process-
democracy values. In the other direction, Richards points out that his
understanding of our commitments implies that we are not
constitutionally obligated to protect "communications [that] do not
serve ... independent conscientious expression and rebuttal about
critical values."' 168 Richards indicates that he would place in this
"unprotected" category communications that
bypass reflective capacities (subliminal advertising); ... [that] do
not express sincere evaluative convictions but knowingly make
false statements of fact (fraud and knowing or reckless defamation
of individuals); ... [or that] state true facts in which there is no
ground for a reasonable interest from the perspective of the critical
expression and discussion of general values. 169
From this perspective, Richards proceeds to characterize and
evaluate the German approach to analyzing the constitutionality of
"group libel" laws 170 and the argument made in the United States that
holdings that "group libel" law are unconstitutional "cast[] in doubt
163. See Richards, supra note 48, at 794-96.
164. Id. at 798.
165. See id. at 800.
166. Id. at 801-02.
167. See id. at 800.
168. Id. at 802.
169. Id. (footnote omitted). Richards also indicates that he believes that prohibitions of
"fighting words" may be unconstitutional. According to Richards, "fighting words" are "ad
hominem insulting epithets" that do not communicate "general claims." Id. at 803 n.71. Since
such communications play no constructive role in "the critical discussion and rebuttal central to
the conscientious formation, revision, and evaluation of values," id. at 801-02, their prohibition
is constitutional even though the prohibition of equally "offensive" general ideas whose
communication is "contextually [as] highly likely [as that of 'fighting words'] to lead to
violence," id. at 803 n.71, is unconstitutional.
170. See id. at 804-09.
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the judicial decisions and laws opposing American apartheid. ' 171 He
concludes that the legitimate State response to the kind of "structural
injustice" that pervades America is not to criminalize group libel but
to take various positive educational steps to combat stereotypical
dehumanization, to pass and enforce antidiscrimination laws that
operate in both public and private spheres, to adopt appropriate
affirmative-action policies, and to take various positive law-
enforcement steps to prevent rights-violating behavior such as racial
harassment.172
CONCLUSION
This symposium contains a wide variety of articles that relate to
"taking legal argument seriously." Two recount historical or
theatrical debates that focus respectively on (1) the difference
between common-law legal argument and statutory interpretation
and (2) the character of legal argument in general. Two analyze the
important role that facts and "transactional understanding" play in
morally-legitimate and valid legal argument. Three present abstract
ideas about morally-legitimate and valid legal argument either in
general or in our culture. Six either criticize nonpositivist jurispruden-
tial conclusions, "conventionalist" moral and jurisprudential
arguments, or the right-answer thesis or reply to these criticisms. Two
describe the ways in which their authors have attempted to induce
their law students to take both specific legal (and law-related)
arguments and the phenomenon "legal argument" seriously. And two
analyze concrete legal-rights or legal-practice issues in ways that take
the relevant specific legal arguments seriously and illuminate the
extent to which the category "legal argument" should be taken
seriously in the various senses of that expression.173
The contributors to this symposium have a wide variety of views
about whether legal argument should be taken seriously in the
various senses of that expression, about whether or the extent to
which legal argument is taken less seriously now than in the past, and
171. Id. at 817.
172. See id. at 817-22. For my comments on Richards' general jurisprudential position and
specific free-speech constitutional-law conclusions, see Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note
4, at 469 n.85.
173. Although I hope that this symposium is more than the sum of its parts, the actual
number of articles it contains (14) is smaller than the sum (17) that would result from adding the
numbers in the paragraph to which this footnote is attached: three articles have been double-
counted since they contain material that belongs in two of the categories the text describes.
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about the consequences of any change that has taken place in the
extent to which legal argument is taken seriously. I hope that this
diversity in their positions has enabled this symposium to achieve its
primary goal: to stimulate constructive debate on each of these issues.

